



ORGANIZATIONAL AND FINANCIAL BACKGROUND OF DISINFORMATION ACTORS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

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INTRODUCTION

The Czech Republic's disinformation scene consisted mainly of alternative [online outlets](#) spreading disinformation and conspiracies in the past, roughly until the Covid-19 pandemic. They were mostly non-transparent, by default hiding and obfuscating their ownership structure, contributors, and financing. However, this scene has diversified significantly in recent years due to the pandemic, the war in Ukraine and domestic political and economic developments. It now also consists of civil movements of “freedom fighters,” influencers, celebrities, far-right/left politicians and individuals who began to engage in the disinformation discourse for their personal interest, for example to cover their debts or enter politics.

Current research into disinformation usually focuses on the content these actors create and spread. However, efforts to curb disinformation actors' activities also require understanding of their motivation, way of operation and business models. Spread of disinformation has proven to be a potentially financially profitable business in our previous [research](#) and this financial motivation adds a new dimension to the societal risk posed by disinformation spreaders.

Therefore, the focus of the present research is the organizational and financial background of disinformation actors in the Czech Republic. The following chapters will introduce what entities are currently active on the Czech disinformation scene, their motivation, and modus operandi, financial background, messaging, and relations between them. Understanding of these attributes is crucial for effective countering of the spread of disinformation, potential coordinated disinformation campaigns and potential sources of foreign malign influence. Such knowledge also helps strengthen efforts based on cutting off the funding streams of disinformation actors.

METHODOLOGY

The findings of this report are based on a sample of 29 disinformation actors who were selected based on their activity, current impact and representativeness during the data collection period from April to June 2023. It is important to note that the goal of the present report is not to determine who does and who does not spread disinformation in the Czech information space. There is already thorough research¹ on who are the active spreaders, supported by long-term expert consensus, and therefore does not need to be replicated. With this in mind, we based the examined list on the Annual Reports on the State of the Disinformation Scene of the think-tank European Values (mainly [2022](#)), as well as investigative work of journalists from [Seznam Zprávy](#), [Deník N](#), [iRadio](#) and others. These researchers and journalists have collected numerous and transparent evidence that the actors in question have spread disinformation and undermined democratic values and institutions in a long-term and systematic manner.

This list of actors was then reviewed in detail in order to uncover the types of entities, their way of operation, funding, motivation, activities and communication channels, and relations between them. The research was based on reviewing public online sources like public databases of physical and legal entities, public registries, domain databases, and internet archives, to name a few examples. An investigative journalist supported this research with an investigation into funding, reviewing transparent accounts.

The goal of this report is not to provide an exhaustive description of each of the 29 examined actors but to provide an overview of the main trends on the Czech disinformation scene and its general modus operandi. However, the report includes an annex with basic information on each of the reviewed actors in the form of a table.

1 Annual Reports on the State of the Disinformation Scene of the think-tank European Values ([2019](#), [2020](#), [2021](#) and [2022](#)), [Seznam zprávy](#), [iRozhlas](#), [iDnes](#), [Deník N](#), [ČT24](#), Manipulátoři - [here](#), [here](#) or [here](#), [Demagog](#), [Hlídací pes](#), [Reflex](#).

WHO ARE THE DISINFORMATION ACTORS?

Although the media outlets and blogs that used to dominate the Czech disinformation space retain some societal influence, there are now other types of entities with a considerable impact. They can be divided into several groups. The largest group are individuals: activists or influencers who became known via social media thanks to their active online presence, viral posts, videos, and livestreams (e.g., Jana Peterková, Jakub Netík). Secondly, there are civil movements and registered associations (e.g., Czech Republic in the 1st Place) which, along with the individuals in the first category, became known thanks to organizing and participating in anti-government protests, whether against Covid-19 restrictions in the past or the economic crisis more recently. A category of its own are certain politicians and political movements, mainly on the non-parliamentary fringes of the political spectrum (e.g., Jindřich Rajchl and his PRO party), with an exception of Tomio Okamura and his parliamentary Freedom and Direct Democracy party. Last but not least are the aforementioned websites known for spreading disinformation and their operators and editors, which have maintained higher readership as well as good relations with political movements that rely on manipulative discourse (e.g., Petr Hájek and his [Protiproud](#), Ondřej Geršl and his [AC24 News](#)).

As can be seen, the Czech disinformation space has a strong political dimension. Out of the 29 examined actors, up to 63% are or used to be involved in politics. While some are like the above-mentioned current party leaders, ranging from the far-right to the far-left, several actors were unsuccessfully politically engaged in nationalist movements in the past and moved to activism instead (Jana Bobošíková, Jiří Havel, Ladislav Vrábel). There is also a considerable overlap between actors coming from the law profession and those who enter politics (Tomáš Nielsen, Jana Zwyrtek Hamplová, Jindřich Rajchl). Another commonality among the actors relates to the movements or associations since many of them rose up during the Covid-19 pandemic (e.g., Manifest, Chcípl PES). Still, several were founded only after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, mainly in reaction to the ensuing economic crisis, such as the Czech Republic in the 1st place in September 2022, or more recently, the Czech Republic Against Poverty in February 2023.

MODUS OPERANDI

Messaging and Goals

The Czech disinformation scene is connected by promoting national-conservative values and agenda. Their proclaimed goals include protection of Czech national interests and representing suppressed voices in the light of alleged infringements of free speech in Czech society. These actors frequently call for the Czech Republic to free itself from direct political “subservience” to international and supranational organizations such as the EU, NATO, the UN, which they see as globalist forces working against national interests. Representatives of both the civil and political movements call for outright exit of the EU (“Czexit”) or NATO, although the EU is a more usual target of criticism. Relatedly, these actors represent political or simply ideological opposition to the current pro-Western government of PM Petr Fiala.

In general, the actors claim to fight for freedom, whether from the Covid “totality” in the past or the dictate of EU and other external “globalist” actors. Geopolitically, the examined actors officially stand for a neutral Czech political position but frequently use openly anti-Western rhetoric. When it comes to the continuing war in Ukraine which is also a big topic for these individuals and movements, the same stances apply: they emphasize national interests and needs over providing help to Ukraine and are especially opposed towards military help, arguing they do not want the Czech Republic to be dragged into the war.

It is worth mentioning that the Covid-19 pandemic represented a significant stepping stone for spreaders of disinformation. Many already known political actors but also new activists built and increased their supporter base publicly speaking against the pandemic measures introduced by the government. Many new projects (Tomáš Nielsen's Health Forum) and political movements (David Tesař's Manifest.cz) were founded based on this agenda and operate until today, although with significantly decreased impact. After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, most of these actors seamlessly changed their messaging to geopolitical topics, often [repeating](#) pro-Russian interpretations of the war.

The pandemic also intensified the trend of the disinformation scene changing from non-transparent outlets to public faces. Manipulative content is not limited to websites and blogs anymore, but circulates on platforms such as Facebook, Telegram, and YouTube. The content the disinformation actors create became more interactive, including livestreams and videos where the actors address their supporters in a very familiar and informal manner.

Motivation

A close examination of these actors has revealed two predominant motivations: ideological-political and financial, alternatively a mix of those two. The actors often use polarizing issues in order to gain political capital and media attention and expand their voter base (Tomio Okamura or Jindřich Rajchl). On the other hand, political motivation frequently pits these actors against each other. A special category is represented by ideologically motivated actors who run (unrelated) businesses that they can use to fund their disinformation-spreading and other polarizing activities (like practice of law, examples being Tomáš Nielsen, Jana Zwyrtek Hamplová and more).

Primarily financially motivated actors are also diverse. Some have turned the spread of disinformation into [a business](#), such as the entrepreneur Ondřej Geršl with the popular outlet AC24 News among other outlets under his operation. However, in some cases, the financial motivation stems from a more pressing necessity — many of the activists and influencers utilizing disinformation are facing disrepair and insolvency and try to get money from their supporters under the pretense of fighting for freedom (Ladislav [Vrábel](#), Jana [Peterková](#)).

Online Reach and Impact

So far, the disinformation actors in the Czech Republic mostly remain an anti-system force on the fringes of both the media space and the political spectrum. Only Tomio Okamura's Freedom and Direct Democracy is in the parliament (with 20 out of a total of 200 MPs) and is currently at 8.5% in the [polls](#). Other political movements heavily relying on disinformation are below the electability threshold of 5%. In the online space, most actors do not have more than 80,000 followers on their Facebook pages.² There are exceptions, including Tomio Okamura with 394,000 followers, who belongs to the most impactful Czech politicians online based on the number of interactions his posts get, thanks to his ability to create viral content exploiting strong emotions and the current societal mood. Jindřich Rajchl has also proven to be [influential online](#) when it comes to disseminating content which attempts to undermine support for Ukraine.

This illustrates that within the examined sample, it is mainly actors active in political parties who have more significant online followership and impact. An exception is the category of operators of websites

2 Facebook is still the most used social media platform in the Czech Republic and therefore relevantly demonstrates online reach.

known for spreading disinformation, who, instead of personal social media accounts, use the websites with their established followership of hundreds of thousands or even millions visits per month³ to promote their ideological stances.

On the other hand, there are actors for whom online followership is not a relevant indicator, as their impact demonstrates more in the offline world, e.g., at the “anti-poverty” anti-government protests (organized, for example, by Ladislav Vrábek, with one of the demonstrations [attended](#) by over 70,000 people, or by Jindřich Rajchl with [similar](#) estimates). In other cases, their impact was carried mainly by individual viral posts or videos whose hostile content sometimes led to their creators facing trial (Patrik Tušl, Tomáš Čermák).

FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

The financial background of the disinformation actors is diverse and can be divided into four broad categories which can overlap. The first category consists of actors who founded political movements, which, in some cases, receive over millions of Czech crowns to their transparent accounts (€40,000 and more), e.g., Rajchl’s PRO party.

The second category, which overlaps with the political category, are actors with other various business activities which they can potentially use to support their polarizing activities and spread of disinformation. Many individuals are practicing law or running law firms (Norbert Naxera, Tomáš Nielsen, Jindřich Rajchl, Jana Zwyrtek Hamplová, and others) and some have been involved in trials against other disinformation actors as their [defense attorneys](#). Several actors have a record in the Czech business registry as owners, shareholders, board members, and executives in various private companies. It is not possible to determine what they are using the income for, including disinformation activities (except for lawyers). Disinformation seems to be a source of extra money rather than a main source of income for these actors. These people also often found other projects and associations that further help them collect money and increase outreach under the banner of a fight for “freedom and truth”. Examples are Rajchl or Nielsen, the latter with his Health Forum project created in the pandemic times which has received several millions of Czech crowns to its transparent account. The initiative has, to date, [spent](#) roughly one million Czech crowns (€40,000) on “graphics, advertising, text, and internet work — web and PR” and on legal services. This money was paid out to the movement’s founders, Tomáš Nielsen and Jan Tománek, who received 60,000 Czech crowns (roughly €2,500) monthly each. Both of them earned over a million Czech crowns (over €40,000) during the existence of the Health Forum, including the service fees. Naturally, with the pandemic’s end, the contributions began to decrease.

The third case relates mainly to actors with high financial motivation due to their financial problems. These actors collect money via voluntary contributions to transparent bank accounts, allegedly to help organize protests or create video content. Sometimes, the actors also involve their current bank accounts which lower the overall transparency of this financing model. In general, those facing (numerous) restraint(s) seem to be mainly individuals without an organizational affiliation (Jana Peterková, Patrik Tušl, Jakub Netík). Some of these actors also tried to deposit the collected money into their partners’ accounts (Ladislav Vrábek, Jakub Netík) in an attempt to avoid the obligation of covering their debts. To illustrate, Vrábek, who faces several restraints in the Czech Republic and sells real estate in Serbia at the same time, obtained 1,400,000 Czech crowns (roughly €60,000) for organizing protests, according to his transparent account. Others, like Jana Peterková, former TV reporter currently facing trial for spreading an alarming message about Covid-19, asks her supporters for money using emotional blackmail (stating purposes like medical care or childcare).

3 According to the [Similar Web](#) online tool.

The last category is represented by operators of the websites known for spreading disinformation which are mainly financed via voluntary contributions to non-transparent accounts and advertising revenue, less frequently accompanied by e-shops or premium content (Geršl and his AC24, Pešl with his Aeronet or Hájek and Protiproud). The advertising revenue is the most problematic aspect in this category. With advertising mainly placed on these websites through online auctions and programmatic purchases of advertising space, many advertisers (not only private companies, but also public services or non-profit organizations) do not know their ads appear on such websites and help their operation with their money. Many brands also do not know they have control over where their advertising appears and that they can blacklist such websites when placing ads. Another problematic aspect is these websites often do not comply with legislation on proper ad and paid brand cooperation labeling.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Czech disinformation space has transformed from non-transparent online outlets to a plethora of public facing individuals and activists often interconnected with various civil organizations, political movements, as well as private companies. They use polarizing topics and trade in fear to gain media attention, political capital or even financial profit, targeting national-conservative voters and people dissatisfied with the current political leadership and concerned about their future prospects due to the war in Ukraine and economic crisis.

For now, only the politically active actors seem to have somehow considerable societal impact. But in the case of many of the activists and civil movements, future political aspirations cannot be ruled out, since they regularly interact and cooperate with the political part of the disinformation space and often have their own unsuccessful political past which led them to civil activism in the first place. Currently, the monitored actors mainly represent the fringes of the political and media/influencer scene with a limited audience. Nevertheless, a potential threat is posed by their attempts to address people (and voters) who are undecided about critical issues such as whether the Czech Republic belongs to the West, East, or a neutral position in-between, whether to actively support Ukraine or who to vote for (30%-35% according to [socio-logical research](#)).

Ideology built on national interests is a connecting factor between these actors, but political aspirations seem to actually reduce their chances of cooperation since they become competitors. Their inability to coordinate and form more impactful alliances to enter mainstream politics was demonstrated by their lack of success in the 2021 [parliamentary election](#). Financial motivation, both in the sense of a business model and as a way to alleviate the actors' financial problems in some cases, also suggests continuation of occasional limited cooperation of individuals and organizations and generally rather fragmentation of the disinformation space despite ideological commonalities.

Despite this current fragmentation, the government institutions, media and civil society need to stay active in the fight against disinformation, so the trend does not change. Therefore, we recommend that:

- The Czech government should not only bring back activities in support of a structured fight against disinformation but also intensify them. There were signs of the issue of disinformation rising within the government's security agenda in the recent past, especially with the appointment of a government representative for media and disinformation and preparations of an action plan for fighting disinformation. Once this position was canceled in February, and the related agenda moved to the wider portfolio of the national security advisor, the issue fell into the background again.

In order to be effective, the fight against disinformation needs to be structured and coordinated which requires dedicated teams and positions with accessible resources to devise strategies but also to implement them on a practical level.

- Investigative work into the financial and organizational background of disinformation actors should be actively supported. Past [cases](#) have proved such investigations can uncover complex connections between these actors and the private sector, including companies from hostile countries such as Russia. Such information is crucial for effective defunding of these malign actors and also to inform the public about who they are potentially supporting with their likes or even their own money.
- The financial aspect of disinformation and the general issue of transparency should be accounted for when implementing counter-disinformation strategies like education in media literacy and strategic communication. Reactive content-based approaches like fact-checking can have varying impact — sometimes they just provide more attention to manipulative and polarizing content without the intended effect. An alternative approach is being tested with [“inoculation” theory](#) which warns the audience about the manipulative techniques they may face rather than about specific content.

Another content-neutral approach can focus on the financial aspect of disinformation and lead people to demand more transparency from the examined actors to know where their contributions to the “fight for freedom” really go. Audiences could be receptive to this approach especially in the current time of economic crisis when Czechs [perceive](#) rising prices as the biggest challenge facing the country. On the other hand, the ongoing development of the state’s strategic communication capacities is limited by the more general issue of leveling economic differences in the society and across regions. Economically underdeveloped areas traditionally suffer from limited access to social services, infrastructure, and good quality education, which makes it easier for disinformation actors to make an impact among these parts of the population.

- Defunding of disinformation actors should be explored more as a strategy of fighting disinformation with guidelines and principles for public and private entities. It needs to be applied timely considering the dynamic disinformation space. For example, the Czech Ministry of Regional Development [revised](#) their methodology for media contracting and added a chapter emphasizing that state companies should avoid advertising placement on websites spreading disinformation in order not to help fund them with taxpayer money. This however positive step arrived a little late considering such websites are not the main disinformation platform anymore. Processes and competencies allowing quicker responses therefore need to be put in place.
- There is a developing trend of disinformation actors being prosecuted for engaging in illegal activities such as spreading alarming messages or encouraging violence against certain groups. This trend of holding people accountable and communicating about these cases to the public is important to discourage similar activities and also to demonstrate the real-life risks of disinformation.
- It is essential to maintain the relative absence of disinformation actors in the mainstream media and the mainstream public debate. Therefore, the above-mentioned cases need to be framed carefully, and no further unnecessary attention should be given to such actors.

ANNEX 1 – OVERVIEW OF THE EXAMINED ACTORS

Surname, Name	Type of Actor	Organizational Background	Financial Background Related to Disinformation	Affiliation to Parties, Movements, and Initiatives
Bobošíková Jana	Show host, former politician	Currently runs the think-tank Institute of Freedom and Democracy, hosts her show "To Be Clear"	Mostly self-funded, income from ticket sale for discussions, YouTube, activities in organizations and companies	Formerly parties The Independents, Politika 21, Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, Czech Sovereignty
Čermák Tomáš	Convicted activist in relation to disinformation and hate speech	For a while popular on Facebook with Covid-19 related hazing videos	N/A	N/A
David Ivan	Far-right politician, MEP – Identity and Democracy Group	Founder of the New Republic association and a website of the same name	Voluntary contributions and e-shop via the New Republic website, the income and resources of an MEP are at his disposal for political and informational activities	Freedom and Direct Democracy party, New Republic association
Franta Vladimír	Philologist, publicist, journalist	Editor of the Czech version of the Russian online outlet Sputnik	Potential income from his YouTube channel PLŽSK (daily videos, thousands of views)	Sputnik CZ (since Russian invasion to Ukraine, his involvement is obfuscated)
Geršl Ondřej	Businessman, owner of media outlets	Owner of the company AC24 s.r.o. which runs websites AC24 News, Lajkit.cz and others in the past, co-founder of the Association of Independent Media	Voluntary contributions and advertising revenue via AC24 News, Lajkit.cz	AC24 News, Lajkit.cz, Association of Independent Media, in the past: svetkolemnas.info, zdravyclovek.eu, printed monthly Vědomí
Hájek Petr	Former presidential press spokesman for Václav Klaus, former deputy head of the Office of the President of the Republic for Communication and Culture, editor	Founder and editor-in-chief of the Protiproud website	Voluntary contributions and advertising revenue on Protiproud	Protiproud website
Havel Jiří	Co-organizer of protests "Czech Republic in the 1st place"	Founder of the National Recovery Council, former representative of the Chcipl PES initiative (opposing pandemic restrictions)	A project called Parallel with unclear funding, the National Recovery Council collects voluntary contributions	National Recovery Council association, formerly Chcipl PES, used to cooperate with Vrabel (now a competitor)
Koller Martin	Military analyst	Former defense expert for the National Recovery Council	N/A	Formerly the National Recovery Council association
Konečná Kateřina	Far-left politician, MEP – The Left in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL	Leader of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	The income and resources of an MEP are at her disposal for political and informational activities	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia

Surname, Name	Type of Actor	Organizational Background	Financial Background Related to Disinformation	Affiliation to Parties, Movements, and Initiatives
Lipovská Hana	Former politician	Member of the Board of Directors in Bobošíková's think-tank, former member of the Board of Czech Television	States that she contributes financially to Bobošíková's Institute of Freedom and Democracy, used to record videos with Bobošíková, Okamura paid for promotion of their videos on Facebook	Bobošíková's Institute of Freedom and Democracy, formerly the anti-system Free Bloc party (now Czech Sovereignty)
Majerová Zuzana	Far-right politician	Leader of the Tricolour party	N/A	Tricolour party
Makay Daniel	Former politician	Former representative of Okamura's Freedom of Direct Democracy, executive at the (unrelated) company KLIMA-MAKAY s.r.o.	N/A	Formerly Freedom and Direct Democracy
Naxera Norbert	Lawyer	Former politician, founder of the Protestant Church of the Holy Corona, contributor to the Russian military TV Zvezda	N/A	Formerly the National Party, SOM movement, Freedom and Direct Democracy, Free Bloc
Netík Jakub	House painter	Accused of a false warning against deadly effects of Covid-19 vaccines, indicted for denying, questioning, approving, and justifying genocide	Collects contributions for his association Voice of God, Voice of the People, used to sell bleach and ivermectin as Covid-19 treatments, distraint	Voice of God, Voice of the People association
Nielsen Tomáš	Lawyer, far-right politician	1st deputy leader of Rajchl's PRO party, founding member of a legal association, co-founder of anti-Covid projects (e.g. Health Forum)	Multiple anti-Covid projects and related donations from the public, lawyer services for these projects	PRO party, legal association Pro Libertate – Institute of Law and Civil Liberties, Health Forum, Charter 2022
Okamura Tomio	Far-right politician	Leader of the Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD), his extensive presence on social media is key for the political support of the SPD movement	Serial entrepreneur turned politician	Freedom and Direct Democracy, formerly Dawn of Direct Democracy (dissolved)
Ondráček Zdeněk	Former far-left politician	Former deputy for the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and former member of the Permanent Commission for Control of the Activities of the Czech Security Information Service	N/A	Formerly Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
Pešl Marek	Editor	Editor-in-chief of Aeronet News	Voluntary contributions on his Aeronet website and sale of books	Aeronet website

Surname, Name	Type of Actor	Organizational Background	Financial Background Related to Disinformation	Affiliation to Parties, Movements, and Initiatives
Peterková Jana	Former TV reporter, politician, and convicted activist	Spreader of alarming messages, wanted to run in the 2023 presidential elections	Asks for donations for her activism, medical care or legal services, organizes a "webinar" on fundraising in spite of multiple distrains	Formerly the Unvaccinated party
Polanský Jaroslav	Editor-in-chief	Editor-in-chief of the gray zone online outlet Parlamentní listy	Parlamentní listy (on average 4.76 million monthly visits) collects advertising revenue	Parlamentní listy news outlet
Rajchl Jindřich	Far-right politician, organizer of demonstrations "Czech Republic Against Poverty"	Chairman of the Law Respect Expertise Party (PRO), chairman of the Czech Republic Against Poverty and For Freedom associations, private companies executive	PRO party's donations, collects contributions via the accounts of Czech Republic Against Poverty and For Freedom association	PRO party, Czech Republic Against Poverty association, formerly Tricolour party
Skála Josef	Far-left politician	Active in associations promoting left-wing ideas (Institute of the Czech left, Where From the Crisis), former vice-chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	N/A, used to have transparent account due to a presidential candidacy, without a significant amount of money	Institute of the Czech Left director, Where From the Crisis association, formerly Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
Ševčík Miroslav	Economist, university teacher, dean	Dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Economics in Prague, economic advisor for the Tricolour party	N/A	Tricolour party
Šoural Jan	Co-organizer of anti-government protests	N/A	distrain	N/A
Tesař David	Right-wing "anti-covidism" politician	Chairman of Manifest.cz – True Freedom and Prosperity	N/A	Manifest.cz – True Freedom and Prosperity, electoral cooperation with the Tricolour party
Tušl Patrik	Activist convicted for extremism and threats	Former vice-chairman of the Unvaccinated party	Voluntary contributions for his activism, distrain	Formerly the Unvaccinated party
Vitásková Alena	Former public servant, former politician	Founder of the Institute of Alena Vitásková, former chairwoman of the Energy Regulatory Office of the Czech Republic	Voluntary contributions via the Institute of Alena Vitásková, sale of books	Formerly the Dawn - National Coalition movement (founded by Tomio Okamura)
Vrábel Ladislav	Organizer of anti-government protests	Founder of the Czech Republic in the 1st Place association, former businessman	Voluntary contributions (also from protests), sale of real estate in Serbia, distrain	Formerly the Green Party and Open Czech Republic to a Normal Life
Zwyrtek Hamplová Jana	Senator, lawyer	Senate of the Czech Republic, Member of the association Pro Libertate – Institute of Law and Civil Liberties	Practice of law	Formerly the Czech Social Democratic Party, Independents Movement, currently legal association Pro Libertate – Institute of Law and Civil Liberties