Global Space Security Landscape

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Presentation Overview

- 1. Review of Global Space Security Trends
- 2. Space Security in An Era of Hybrid Operations
- 3. Economic and Financial Operations as a Strategic Threat
- 4. Key Challenges Ahead



1. Review of Global Space Security Trends

- Increasing number of space-dependent governments and private actors
- Counterspace dynamic driven by new China Russia U.S. space race
- Other nations seeking space capabilities for national security purposes (e.g. France, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, etc.)
- Non-reversible, destructive ASAT capabilities are among the most prominent concerns (U.S., Russia, China, and India demonstrated ASAT capability)
- "Grey zone" spectrum of threats associated with deliberate, reversible actions by state actors which are asymmetric in their knock-on effects
- Cyber-related vulnerabilities of space assets a major concern
- Heightened concern over terrestrial disputes cascading into space due to a deteriorating geopolitical environment among the major space powers



2. Space Security in An Era of Hybrid Operations

Space Hybrid Operation	Examples
Directed Energy Operations that May Result in Space Debris	Low-Power Laser Dazzling or Blinding High-Power Microwave (HPM) or Ultrawideband (UWB) Emitters
Orbital Operations that Generally Do Not Result in Space Debris	Space Object Tracking and Identification; Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO)
Electronic Operations	Jamming (Orbital/Uplink, Terrestrial/Downlink) Spoofing
Cyber Operations	Attack on satellite or ground station antennas Attack on ground stations connected to terrestrial networks Attack on user terminals that connect to satellites
Economic and Financial (E&F) Operations	Subsidized financing of targeted country's space infrastructure for the purpose of influence/control Provision of end-to-end space capabilities (i.e. space-related infrastructure, equipment, products/services and financing)



3. Economic and Financial Operations as a Strategic Threat



PSSI's Global Map of Chinese and Russian Space Transactions (as of February 29, 2020)

Chinese Transactions Russian Transactions China/Russia Transactions







3. Economic and Financial Operations as a Strategic Threat

- Non-market economic and financial model of China and Russia puts Western companies and countries in disadvantageous position and often results in inordinate dependencies on smaller space nations.
- Recipient countries, which lack expertise and money to develop space capabilities, accept subsidized loans and other arrangements, exposing them to dependency on its "benefactors".
- The rapid growth of international space partnerships forged by Beijing and Moscow pose an asymmetric threat to existing norms and standards and global space commerce.

Image: Kandy Teleport Center (aka Pallekelle Academy), Sri Lanka

(Source: Sundayobserver.lk, 2013)



4. Key Challenges Ahead

- Inherently dual-use nature of most space capabilities (even seemingly benign civilian technologies can have counterspace applications)
- Temptation of state actors to exploit asymmetric warfighting strategies
- Deployment of capabilities that disrupt or deny space benefits temporarily and reversibly
- Ambiguous attribution concerning hostile actions/activities
- Lack of precedents complicating effective preparedness and response strategy
- Doctrine-driven space strategy (integrating technology into a coherent vision for space stability/security) as opposed to technology-driven
- Competing models for space partnering arrangements among state actors
- Cyber threats and offensive economic and financial (E&F) operations in particular could cause major disruptions in the regional balance of power, as well as global space security